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Smith: Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Physicians and the Clash of Lia

BETWEEN THE SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS:
PHYSICIANS AND THE CLASH OF LIABILITY
STANDARDS AND COST CUTTING GOALS
WITHIN ACCOUNTABLE CARE
ORGANIZATIONS
ChristopherSmith*
I. INTRODUCTION

Physicians must often feel as if they are caught between a veritable rock
and a hard place. On the one hand, the movement to reform the health care
system is heavily focused on cost containment in the provision of health
care services.' This push for cost containment is manifested in managed
care organizationS2 (MCOs), pay-for-performance programS3 (P4P) and
consumer-driven health care (CDHC) programs4 demanding high quality
LL.M., 2011, American University Washington College of Law; J.D., 2001, Vanderbilt
University Law School; B.A., 1998, University of Richmond. Christopher Smith is Director
of Policy and Regulatory Affairs for the National Community Pharmacists Association. The
author wishes to thank Professor James Blumstein of Vanderbilt University Law School and
Kavita Patel, M.D., M.S., of the Brookings Institution for their suggestions on this topic.
This article is dedicated to the author's father, the late William B. Smith, Sr., M.D., an
obstetrician/gynecologist, the author's mother, Shirley M. West, R.N., and the author's sister
Vicki West, C.R.N.P.
1. Mercedes Varasteh Dordeski & Kelly N. Stephens, Immigrants and Healthcare: A
Voice for Coverage, 23 Health Law 35, 39 (2010) (discussing the slew of cost cutting
reforms contained within the new federal health care legislation).
2. Katherine L. Record, Wielding the Wand Without Facing the Music: Allowing
Utilization Review Physicians to Trump Doctors' Orders, but Protecting them from the
Legal Risk Ordinarily Attached to the Medical Degree, 59 Duke L.J. 955, 978 (2010)
(describing MCOs' imposition of cost containment measures on medical providers).
3. Thomas Bodenheimer et al., Can Money Buy Quality? PhysicianResponse to Payfor
Performance, 3 Ind. Health L. Rev. 445, 445-46 (2006) (describing pay for performance
arrangements as the provision of financial incentives to medical providers to meet certain
goals, including cost containment).
4. William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-PartyPayments, and Cross-Subsidization:
America's Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. Mem. L. Rev. 279, 404-05 (2009)
(describing consumer-driven health care as an effort encourage providers to reduce their
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care from physicians, while requiring those same physicians to contain
health care costs. While physicians are being bombarded by these cost
containment initiatives, the common law medical malpractice liability
standard of care fails to account for cost cutting in setting the standard of
care.5 Accordingly, physicians are stuck in the middle as they seek to meet
both cost cutting goals and avoid liability under a standard of care that
ignores cost containment. Such is their quandary, and this article seeks to
explore this dilemma within the context of the new Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs).
ACOs are the new kids on the block in the ongoing struggle to achieve
the ever-elusive dual goals of health care reform: cost containment and high
quality care within the United States health care system.6 Under the new
health care reform law, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is required
to promulgate guidance for the creation of ACOs by January 1, 2012.
ACOs are legal entities-comprised of primary care physicians, specialists
and hospitals-that provide care to Medicare patients and receive a share in
savings for meeting cost containment and quality standards that are set by
HHS.
As with any new government program, policy makers, analysts and
scholars will likely be focused on predicting whether ACOs will effectively
achieve their goals and identifying policy problems that are likely to arise
within the ACO context. This article focuses on the latter issue, and more
particularly, whether and how ACOs will impact the tension that physicians
face: meeting cost containment goals while also satisfying medical liability
standards of care that do not account for cost containment.9 Part I of this
Article provides a brief overview of the high level of health care spending
that has been and continues to be the impetus for cost containment efforts
costs through new efficiencies and innovation).
5. M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 389, 452
(2009) (arguing that the professional standards embodied with the standard of care are
minimally sensitive to cost); Dionne Koller Fine, Physician Liability and Managed Care: A
PhilosophicalPerspective, 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 641, 642 (arguing that the medical liability
standard of care rejects the notion of cost-control as a defense to medical malpractice
claims).
6. See generally David G. Owen, Dangers in PrescriptionDrugs: Filling a PrivateLaw
Gap in the HealthcareDebate, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 733 (2010) (identifying cost reduction and
quality improvement as central goals of health care reform).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1) (2010).
8. See id. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A-B), (a)(2)(A-D).
9. James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting:Developing Malpractice
"Safe Harbors" as a New Role for QIOs?, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1017, 1024-26 (2006)
[hereinafter Medical Malpractice] (describing the tension between provider cost containment
care rationing and a medical malpractice doctrine that views economic trade-offs as having
virtually no role in treatment decisions).
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within the health care system. Part II analyzes how tension arises between
cost containment efforts and medical liability standards, and summarizes
recent scholarly literature examining this issue within various contexts,
such as MCOs, P4P initiatives and CDHC programs. Part III provides
some background on ACOs in general, and discusses the PPACA-created
ACOs. Finally, Part IV examines and analyzes how ACOs may exacerbate
the cost containment/liability standard tension and how that tension may
impact ACOs' effectiveness.
II. THE RISING COST OF HEALTHCARE IN THE UNITED STATES

The starting point for understanding ACOs, the cost containment efforts
in the health care system, and the connection and impact that the two have
on medical malpractice liability, is to explore why there is a push for health
care cost containment efforts in the first place. Essentially, the drive for
cost containment is due to large health care costs and health care spending
that continue to spiral upwards. However, increasing costs and spending, in
and of themselves, are not necessarily evidence of a broken system,
provided the increase in spending and costs correlates with equal or greater
improvements in patient outcomes and quality.
Unfortunately, within the health care system, increasing health care costs
"do not appear to be correlated with better quality."' 0 In fact, compared
with other countries, the United States spends more of its GDP on
healthcare than many other nations, with little to show in terms of better
quality outcomes." This means that within our health care system "there is
room for improvement in efficiency; that is, costs could be reduced without
harming quality."' 2 Hence, there is a strong push for cost containment
within the health care system.
Statistics at both the macro- and microeconomic levels demonstrate that
health care costs are spiraling out of control. Starting at the macroeconomic
level, in 1998, the United States spent $1.208 trillion on healthcare." By
2009, a mere eleven years later, that number had more than doubled to over
10. Medicare Payment Advisory Comm'n, Report to the Congress: Improving
(2009),
available at
49,
53
Medicare
Program
in
the
Incentives
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun09 EntireReport.pdf [hereinafter MedPac] (citing
large regional variations in Medicare costs and growth).
11. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, When Patients Say No (To Save Money): An
Essay on the Tectonics of Health Law, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 743, 747 (2009) (arguing that the
United States spends too much money on health care).
12. MedPac, supra note 10, at 53 (arguing that it is easy to conceptualize savings within
the United States health care system).
13. Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., National
Health Expenditures Aggregate, Per Capita Amounts, Percent Distribution, and Average
Annual Percent Growth, by Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 1960-2009, Table 1
(2009), available at http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf
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$2.486 trillion.14 This 2009 statistic represents 17.6% of the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and a spending growth rate of 4%.15 This rate
was higher than both the rate of inflation and the growth rate for national
income. 16
The projected national health care spending statistics look no better for
the future. By 2019, the government estimates that the United States will
spend over $4.482 trillion on health care costs, almost double the spending
level for 2008.'7 Furthermore, the projected spending for 2019 will be
19.3% of the GDP, a higher percentage of the GDP than health care
spending in 2008.18 Moreover, the government predicts that the rate of
health care spending will increase between 3.9% and 7% every year
between 2010 and 2019.19
The United States' health care spending also appears out of control when
compared to other industrialized countries. A recent study found that the
United States spent $7,290 per capita on healthcare in 2007-more than
Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom and New
Zealand.20 Each of the other six industrialized countries spent less than
$4,000 per capita on healthcare in 2007.21 Looking at the data in a different
manner, in 2007, United States health care spending was around 16% of its
GDP, while each of the other six countries spent a substantially lower
22
percentage of their respective GDPs on healthcare.
Unfortunately, the macroeconomic picture of health care spending looks
no brighter than its microeconomic counterpart. For example, in 1999, the
average family employer sponsored health plan cost $5,791 per year in
premiums and by 2009, that same plan cost $13,375 per year, an increase of

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Eric Kimbuende et al., U.S. Health Care Costs, (2010), available at
http://www.kaiseredu.org/ topics im.asp?imlD=1&parentlD=61&id=358 (noting that health
care expenditures have outpaced inflation and income growth). See also Hall & Schneider,
supra note 11, at 747 (noting that "Medical spending has outstripped inflation for decades").
17. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., National
1 (2009), available at
Table
Health Expenditure Projections 2009-2019,
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealth ExpendData/downloads/proj2009.pdf.
18. Id.
19. Id. at Table 2.
20. Karen Davis et al., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of the U.S.
available at
(2010),
2
Internationally
Compares
System
Care
Health
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/-/media/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Jun/1400_
Files/ Davis MirrorMirroronthe wall_2010.pdf.
21. Id. (noting that the other countries studied had per capita expenditures between
$2,454 and $3,895).
22. Id. at 12 (noting that the percentage of GDP spent by the other six countries ranged
between 8.4% and 10.4%).
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131%.23 Breaking these statistics down into employee versus employer
health care spending contributions, the average employee's contribution
increased from $1,543 per year in 1999 to $3,515 per year in 2009, while
the average employer's contribution increased from $4,247 per year in 1999
to $9,860 per year in 2009.24 Combining the cost of health insurance
premiums with all other out-of-pocket expenses, the average person with
employer-sponsored coverage spent $2,827 in out-of-pocket health care
expenditures in 2001, and by 2006, that same person was spending $3,744,
a 30% increase.25
Whether viewed at the macro- or microeconomic level, health care costs
are high and getting higher, and the burden on individuals and employers is
becoming increasingly heavy. These pressures serve as the genesis for the
many of the cost containment efforts within the health care sector.
III.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COST CONTAINMENT AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY

A. The Rationale Behind the Cost Containment/LiabilityStandardConflict
1. Cost Cutting and the Medical Care Cost Curve
At the center of the tension between cost containment goals and the
malpractice liability standard is the debate on whether economic factors,
primarily cost containment, should play a role in medical decision making
and how medicine is practiced. Some contend that the introduction of
economics into medical decision making at any level corrupts medical
judgment.26 Others contend that it is acceptable for cost cutting efforts to
influence medical judgment within certain limits. 27 Still others view the
interconnectedness of the two concepts to be inevitable.28
Although there is debate over whether cost containment should play a
role in medical decision making, there is less of a debate regarding whether
23. Gary Claxton et al., Employer Health Benefits 2009 Annual Survey 21, 32 (2009),
availableat http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/7936.pdf.
24. Id. at 71.
25. Michael Halle & Meena Seshamani, Office of Health Reform, Hidden Costs of
Health Care: Why Americans are Paying More but Getting Less, Hidden Costs of
http://www.healthreform.gov/
at
available
(2010),
Report
HealthCare
reports/hiddencosts/index.html.
26. James F. Blumstein, Of Doctors and Hospitals: Setting the Analytical Framework
for Managing and Regulating the Relationship, 4 Ind. Health L. Rev. 211, 212 (2007)
[hereinafter Of Doctors and Hospitals] (outlining the various views on whether economic
considerations should factor into treatment decisions).
27. Id.
28. Id.
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or not it is acceptable to introduce cost containment initiatives at the flat
point of the medical care cost curve. At that point on the curve, any cost
cutting is merely clear cut waste control, or the elimination of medical
spending which yields no additional benefits. 2 9 For example, few, if any,
would argue that private insurers, Medicare, or Medicaid should pay for a
cholesterol test for a patient dying of terminal cancer with two weeks left to
live. To do so would be to increase costs with no return in benefits.
The true heart of the cost containment debate lies in whether costs should
be cut at the cost control point of the medical care cost curve, or the point at
which additional spending yields benefits, but marginally so in light of the
costs expended. 3 0 Hypothetically, such a situation might occur when an
MRI yields a 95% accurate diagnosis of a brain aneurysm, but an additional
spinal tap on top of the MRI would yield a 99.9% accurate diagnosis.
Therein lies the point at which physicians will resist cost containment
initiatives for fear of incurring medical liability. For at that point on the
cost curve, such cost cutting may actually involve cutting marginally
beneficial care within the standard of care.
2. Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Cost Cutting
In part, as a reflection of the central debate regarding whether or not cost
saving concepts should play a role in medical decision-making, liability
standards conflict with cost containment goals in a number of ways. To
start with, as a matter of current law and medical ethics, the medical
standard of care cannot vary according to ability to pay.31 This non-costconscious standard is entrenched in our legal system - as demonstrated
when patients try to fully or partially waive liability in exchange for less
costly, but suboptimal care. In those situations, courts generally refuse to
enforce such a waiver because of the fiduciary relationship between a
doctor and patient.32
There are two core beliefs behind the legal and ethical standard of
29. Id. at 215 (arguing that "[e]liminating zero-benefit diagnoses and treatments is
uncontroversial.").
30. Id. at 215-16 (arguing that it is more difficult to achieve a goal of eliminating
marginally beneficial care in the name of cost savings).
31. See generally Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What if You Could Sue Your HMO?
Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 235, 285 (2003)
(arguing that the medical standard of care exists based on a fallacy that there is one correct
treatment to be determined without reference to cost); Mark A. Hall, Payingfor What You
Get and Getting What You Pay For: Legal Responses to Consumer-DrivenHealth Care, 68
Law & Contemp. Probs. 159, 176 (2006) (noting that the "medical malpractice standard of
care does not vary according to a patient's insurance or financial situation"); Fine, supra
note 5, at 651 (noting that the medical profession has long believed that cost should never be
a part of the treatment relationship).
32. Hall, supra note 31, at 176.
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entitlement to care regardless of cost and ability to pay. First, is the core
belief that every individual is entitled to all beneficial medical care,
regardless of cost.33 Second, and related, is the belief that it would be
socially unjust and ethically repulsive for the law to hold that the indigent
and uninsured are entitled to a lower standard of care than the insured
population, and allow physicians to lower their standard of care for such
indigent, uninsured patients.3 4 The general problem with this non-costconscious standard of medical liability is that it falsely assumes that society
has unlimited resources to devote to healthcare. 5
3. Defensive Medicine
Medical liability standards also conflict with cost containment efforts
through physicians' fear of liability and how that fear incentivizes
physicians to provide as much care as possible in hopes of covering every
conceivable basis for a lawsuit. 36 This fear-driven increase in the amount of
care also increases the costs of care. Out of such fear is born the concept
of defensive medicine, under which the fear of being sued for malpractice
encourages physician overutilization and over-deterrence in diagnostic
testing and treatment.38
Defensive medicine and the tendency to promote overutilization is a
result, to some extent, of a medical malpractice system in which the
standard of care is not officially set until after the injury has occurred and
expert witnesses, during trial, define the standard post-hoc.3 9 This ex ante
uncertainty as to the contours of the standard of care is exacerbated by
evidence of widespread "variation in practice patterns unexplained by

33. Fine, supra note 5, at 663 (arguing "that the dominant view is that there is an
absolute moral prohibition against physicians considering the costs of treatment").
34. Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 752-53 (arguing that "judges are loath to have
tort law ratify the social injustice of unaffordable health care").
35. Fine,supra note 5, at 664-65 (arguing that current law prohibiting the consideration
of costs in treatment decisions ignores economic and medical realities).
36. Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 748 (arguing that providers follow the belief that
the more thorough the care, the less likely they are to be sued).
37. Fine, supra note 5, at 685-86 (arguing that liability suits have created pressure to
escalate treatment costs).
38. Claire Bartholome, Leveraging Our Strengths: Reinforcing Pay-For-Performance
Programsas the Solution for Defensive Medicine, 4 J. Health & Biomedical L. 333, 333-34
(2008) (describing defensive medicine as providers avoiding high-risk procedures and
patients, and ordering clinical-excessive tests in an effort to guard against malpractice
claims); Medical Malpractice, supra note 9, at 1020-21 (defining defensive medicine as
over-deterrence in medical practice driven by an effort to conform to uncertain standards of
care).
39. Medical Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1028-29 (noting the practice standards are not
definitively established until after an injury has occurred).

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

7

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4

Annals of Health Law

172

[Vol. 20

outcomes data."40 Too often, the applicable standard of care may be
somewhat of a mystery at the time of diagnosis or treatment.
The practice of defensive medicine is exponentially promoted through
the traditional third-party payment system for insurance, where neither the
doctor nor the patient fully "feels" the financial impact of the treatment
decisions being made.4 1 In the end, physicians provide excessive care to
adjust for clinical and structural uncertainty in the medical malpractice
doctrine, and are rewarded for such behavior by a third-party fee-for-service
(FFS) payment system. 42
4. The Professional Paradigm Philosophy
The historically dominant philosophical view of how medical decisions
should be made and how medicine should be practiced also promotes the
conflict between malpractice liability standards and cost containment
concepts. That philosophy is embodied within the scientific or professional
view, which considers medical decision-making to be entirely scientific and
views the introduction of economic criteria into that decision making
process as a corruption of scientific purity. 43 The scientific paradigm
considers costs to be irrelevant because it follows the belief that there is a
single unitary standard of care to be followed within medicinal practice.44
Medical malpractice liability as a legal doctrine embodies the
professional or scientific model of medical decision-making.4 5 By contrast,
traditional tort law, outside of the medical malpractice context, evaluates
allegedly negligent conduct using a "reasonableness" standard that
incorporates costs and benefits, and risks and rewards into the analysis of
whether negligence has occurred. 4 6 The existence of a third-party payment
system, mentioned earlier, takes cost and benefit balancing out of the
equation in the medical malpractice context.47

40. Id. at 1026.
41. Id. at 1025 (arguing that "third-party medical insurance allows patients and
physicians to 'overutiliz[e]. . .medical resources').
42. Id at 1031.
43. Of Doctors and Hospitals,supra note 26, at 220 (arguing that the professional model
"assumes that diagnosis and treatment decisions are not influenced by financial incentives.").
44. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 31, at 285-86 (discussing medical malpractice doctrine
as encompassing a one-right-way approach to the practice of medicine); Medical
Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1024 (arguing that medical malpractice assumes "that science
has established a single or unitary standard of practice").
45. Medical Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1023.
46. Id at 1025 (arguing that traditional tort law views the customary practice standard as
a market-validated standard that encompasses cost and benefits).
47. Id. at 1025.
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5. Paramount Patient Interests
Also embodying the conflict between medical liability standards and cost
cutting concepts is the requirement of medical ethics and the medical
liability standard that "physicians [] promote their [individual] patients'
interests above all others.'48 This requirement directly conflicts with cost
cutting concepts because this standard cannot be met on an individual
patient basis for all patients; health care resources are finite, limited, and
require rationing at some point along the health care spending continuum. 49
As a result, for a physician to strive to meet cost cutting goals "exposes
the
50
physician to potential liability for 'failing to do the impossible.',,
6. The Non-Cost-Conscious Liability Standard
The most self-evident way in which liability standards and cost saving
efforts conflict is through the failure of the medical liability standard to take
cost containment goals into consideration.5 As long as the medical liability
standard fails to consider cost cutting, the goal of cost containment is nearly
impossible to achieve. Physicians will resist rationing care and cost
containment efforts, so long as they know that such efforts are disregarded
in determining the standard of care in the medical liability determination. 2
In the world of a non-cost-conscious medical liability standard, there is no
reward for cutting costs, only potential punishment.
B. The Cost Containment/LiabilityStandardConflict Across Contexts
Scholars have explored the tension between cost containment and
medical malpractice liability in a variety of contexts over the years,
including consumer-driven health care cost containment efforts, Medicare
cost containment efforts and private insurer managed care cost containment
efforts.5 3 The following section explores some of the more recent literature
48. Fine, supra note 5, at 665.
49. Id. at 665 (arguing that it is a false assumption to assume that society has unlimited
resources for medical care).
50. Id. at 666.
51. Id. at 685 (arguing that the current liability standard undermines cost containment
objectives because it subjects providers "to liability for rationing care as a way to control
costs").
52. Id. (arguing that the current liability scheme results in providers who "will not and
do not fully embrace cost containment efforts).
53. See generally Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 753, citing E. Haavi Morreim,
Holding Health Care Accountable, 83, 96 (Oxford 2001); James F. Blumstein, Rationing
Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 1345,
1397 (1981); Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and
Customary Practice, 1975 Duke L.J. 1375, 1408 (1975); Jonathan J. Frankel, Medical
MalpracticeLaw andHealth Care Cost Containment:Lessons for Reformersfrom the Clash
of Cultures, 103 Yale L.J. 1297, 1322 (1994); Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and
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on this tension across a few different contexts.
1. Managed Care Organizations
The starkest example of the tension between health care cost containment
and the malpractice liability standard arises within the context of managed
care, where MCOs "control health care costs by controlling physician
behavior and limiting patients' utilization of services."5 In these situations,
physicians' ethical and legal obligations to see that the patient's needs come
first and that patients receive a high quality of care, regardless of cost, clash
with the MCOs' efforts to push physicians to ration care and cut costs.55
The clash between MCO cost containment and medical liability
standards tends to arise when the physician and managed care insurer
disagree on a treatment, such that the physician believes that the treatment
is medically necessary, but the insurer refuses to provide coverage,
believing that the treatment is not medically necessary.5 6 The MCO's
decision usually trumps the physician's decision because most patients
cannot afford treatment without insurance.5 7 As a result, what all too often
happens is that the patient does not receive the physician recommended
treatment, suffers a resulting injury from the coverage/treatment decision
and files a malpractice suit when he or she discovers that the physician's
treatment recommendation-not the MCO's coverage decision-was
This scenario illustrates how MCO-imposed cost cutting may
correct.

Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 985, 989-94 (1986);
Mark A. Hall, The MalpracticeStandard UnderHealth Care Cost Containment, 17 L. Med.
& Health Care 347, 351 (1989); Marshall B. Kapp, Legal and EthicalImplications ofHealth
Care Reimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 L. Med. & Health Care 245, 252
(1984); Andrea Jean Lairson, Comment, Reexamining the Physician's Duty of Care in
Response to Medicare's Prospective Payment System, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 791, 803-807
(1987); Robert C. Macaulay, Jr., Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice:
On a Collision Course, 21 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 91, 103-08 (1987); Maxwell J. Mehlman,
The Patient-PhysicianRelationship in an Era of Scarce Resources: Is There a Duty to
Treat?, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 349, 361-67 (1993); Laura Athens Mellas, Adapting the Judicial
Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims Against Physicians to Reflect Medicare Cost
Containment Measures, 62 U. Colo. L. Rev. 287, 300-303 (1991); Rand E.
Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 Tex. L. Rev.
1401, 1416-19 (1981); Peter H.Schuck, MalpracticeLiability and the Rationing of Care, 59
Tex. L. Rev. 1421, 1421 (1981); John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical
Malpractice Standard, 77 Va. L. Rev. 439, 458-60 (1991); Note, Rethinking Medical
MalpracticeLaw in Light ofMedicare Cost-Cutting,98 Harv. L. Rev. 1004, 1015-19 (1985).
54. Fine, supra note 5, at 647; Record, supra note 2, at 977 (describing the essence of
MCOs as having control over provider decision making).
55. Fine, supra note 5, at 641-42 (discussing the providers' increased liability risk as a
result of MCO imposed health care rationing).
56. Record, supra note 2, at 956-57.
57. Id. at 965.
58. Id. at 957.
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actually cause the physician to cut care "that may be beneficial and within
the current standard of care."5 9
Ironically, even though the MCO exerts extensive control over the
physician's treatment decision, the Employee Retirement and Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts most state law claims against many
MCOs, and therefore, the physician usually remains solely liable for any
adverse outcome.o Most MCOs generally avoid any form of liability for
their coverage decisions. ERISA applies to MCOs that are employersponsored health plans and preempts state law malpractice claims against
those MCOs, while also failing to provide for a federal tort remedy against
them. 61 This is a bit of an oversimplification of the confusing and complex
liability standards and case law governing the application of ERISA to
MCO liability, but for purposes of this article it is sufficient to note three
summarizing principles from the ERISA statute and guiding case law.
First, plan beneficiaries can bring ERISA claims in federal court for breach
of contract and collect breach of contract damages against ERISA covered
MCOs, but there are no ERISA tort claims or ERISA tort damages to be
had against ERISA covered MCOs. 62 Second, ERISA preempts plan
beneficiaries' state tort claims against ERISA governed MCOs as to any
claims involving eligibility decisions 63 or administration of benefits
decisions. 6 4 Lastly, ERISA preempts tort claims founded upon MCO
coverage decisions involving both treatment and plan benefit decisions,
provided the patient's treating physician was not involved in the utilization
review decision 65 and/or "the medical judgment was made by a utilization
59. Fine, supra note 5, at 642.
60. Record, supra note 2, at 977 (explaining that federal preemption shields most MCOs
from state malpractice "liability even when they make coverage decisions regarding the
medical necessity of care").
61. The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a),
1144 (2006); Record, supra note 2, at 957 (noting that ERISA preempts state law "liability
for employer-sponsored health plans relating to the administration of health benefits, but
does not impose parallel federal liability in its place").
62. Fine, supra note 5, at 660 (noting that ERISA allows injured plan beneficiaries to
recover only the benefits due under the terms of the health plan and not compensatory or
punitive damages); Record, supra note 2, at 965 (noting that ERISA "allows plan
beneficiaries to challenge coverage decisions for breach of contract, but not for negligence").
63. Record, supra note 2, at 968 ("refusing to allow a claim filed under ERISA to allege
breach of fiduciary duty where the contested action involved an element of a treatment
decision, rather than a pure eligibility decision") (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,
229-31 (2000)).
64. Id. at 968-69 ("reasoning that a state or common law cause of action 'based on
alleged improper processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan,
undoubtedly meet[s] the criteria for pre-emption') (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987)).
65. Record, supra note 2, at 970-71 ("holding that a claim challenging denial of
coverage that entails a mixed eligibility and coverage decision is not preempted when that
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review physician who never saw the patient."6 6
The important point is that plaintiffs have few, if any, remedies against
MCOs that are subject to ERISA, and instead must focus their grievances
against their physicians.67 Accordingly, as stated at the outset, the
physicians are essentially caught in the middle as the standard of care to
which they are subject ignores costs, does not account for the cost saving
pressures from MCOs, and even treats the physician as "having a duty to
resist being tainted by the pressures of managed health care and cost
containment." 68 In some areas, physicians may sustain liability "for not
working hard enough through appeals [of MCO utilization decisions] or
otherwise to secure treatment for the patient." 6 9 The bottom line is that the
managed care system forces the physician to ration care at the bedside and
then face potential malpractice liability for engaging in MCO-imposed
rationing behavior.
Turning to why the tension between cost cutting and liability arises in the
managed care context, the tension arises, to some extent, because
physicians and MCOs have different perspectives regarding how they view
treatment decisions. Physicians focus on the individual patient and what is
best for him or her, whereas MCO cost containment efforts focus on what is
best for society as a whole by attempting to efficiently utilize limited health
care resources.70
decision was made by either the treating physician or his employer") (citing Land v. CIGNA
Healthcare of Fla., 381 F.3d 1274, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)).
66. Record, supra note 2, at 968; see, e.g., Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the plaintiffs' state tort claims against the defendant
insurance company for negligent supervision and training of personnel and negligent
infliction of emotional distress were preempted by ERISA because they "create[d] a threat of
conflicting and inconsistent state and local regulation of the administration of ERISA
plans"); Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941-43 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
plaintiffs' state law claims against the defendant insurance company for wrongful death,
improper refusal to authorize benefits, medical malpractice, and insurance bad faith were
preempted by ERISA because they related to the insurance plan); Corcoran v. United
HealthCare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that, because the defendant
insurance company had made "medical decisions incident to benefit determinations," the
plaintiffs' state tort action for wrongful death of their child was preempted by ERISA
(emphasis added)); Elsesser v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 802 F. Supp. 1286, 1290-91
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that the plaintiffs' state tort negligence claims, founded on the
defendant insurance company's refusal "to pay for the [requested medical device]," were
preempted by ERISA when the plaintiffs sought to hold the company "directly liable" for
negligence, explaining that "such a claim. . .clearly has a [connection to] a benefit plan"
(second alteration in original)).
67. Record, supra note 2, at 957 (noting that the provider often pays the price for
injuries resulting from MCO coverage decisions, not the MCO).
68. Fine, supra note 5, at 642. See also Record, supra note 2, at 984 (noting that
providers "must formally protest a plan's denial of coverage for medically necessary care").
69. Fine, supra note 5, at 675.
70. Fine, supra note 5, at 644, 646 (contrasting the fee-for-service focus on what is best
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The cost containment/liability standard conflict also exists within the
MCO context because physicians are subject to conflicting incentives in the
MCO world. On one hand, the physician's level of income is tied to
successfully meeting managed care cost cutting goals." On the other hand,
the physician has an ethical incentive to ensure patient well-being,
regardless of cost, as well as a medical liability based incentive to provide
the patient with any and all care within the standard of care, regardless of
cost.72 Even if the physician stands to benefit financially from cutting costs,
the fiduciary relationship between physicians and patients requires
physicians to place their patients' interests above their own.73
Related to the conflicting incentives faced by physicians, the MCOs'
incentives in making treatment decisions are not aligned with the
physicians' incentives in providing treatment. As discussed above, the
former can generally cut costs at will with little fear of liability due to
ERISA preemption, whereas the substantial fear of potential malpractice
liability causes the latter to engage in costly defensive medicine.74 ERISA
allows MCOs "to behave as they choose with little accountability to their
members or to the public." ERISA promotes a legal framework that fails
to deter negligent coverage denials by MCOs. 76 The physician, on the other
hand, bears responsibility for everything despite the fact that the MCO
exerts great control over treatment decisions through the power of the
purse.n In the end, the respective liability to which physicians and MCOs
are subject is inverse to the control that each one has over treatment
decisions.
The ERISA system also promotes the cost containment/liability standard
conflict by encouraging lawsuits against physicians, but not against MCOs.
Plaintiffs, knowing the ERISA obstacles for a successful tort claim against
a MCO, will try to couch their medical tort claims as negligence claims
for the individual patient with the MCO focus on what is the best treatment from society's
perspective); Record, supra note 2, at 980 (discussing the physician's duty of loyalty to
individual patients).
71. Id. at 649.
72. Id (describing how physicians' incomes within MCOs are in conflict with patient
well-being).
73. Id. at 655 (discussing provider's duty to serve their patients' interests above their
own).
74. Record, supra note 2, at 957-58, 964-65 (discussing how providers serve as the
"deep pockets" for patients to recover for injuries caused by MCO coverage decisions, while
MCOs escape from liability even when the denial of coverage is negligent).
75. Fine, supra note 5, at 660.
76. Record, supra note 2, at 987-88 (arguing that "applying contract law [under ERISA]
to utilization review decisions fails to deter negligent coverage denials").
77. Id. at 981-83 (noting that providers may bear the entire burden of liability when an
MCO wrongfully denies coverage).
78. Id. at 994.
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against physicians, even if those claims are more appropriately directed at
the MCO.79 The beneficiary's incentive to sue the physician instead of the
MCO is even stronger because the damages available in tort actions against
physicians are much greater than those available in contract actions against
MCOs.s0 Recognizing the beneficiary's strong incentive to sue the
physician over the MCO, physicians are more likely to practice defensive
medicine than if MCOs faced a similar liability risk with regard to their
treatment decisions. However, these mounting tort liability pressures on
physicians, occur at the same time as and are in conflict with MCO imposed
cost cutting pressures.
Physicians face competing pressures from all sides within the MCO
context and the extent of pressure on the physician to ration care from the
MCO side is exacerbated by the very real possibility that if the physician
does not meet the MCO's cost cutting expectations, then he or she may be
terminated from the MCO's physician network and from providing care to
the MCO's patients.8 ' This pressure is significant, given that MCOs have
substantial market power, physicians economically rely on MCOs for a
sufficient pool of patients to sustain their practices, and, once terminated,
physicians' reputations suffer and they are less likely to be able to join
another MCO. 82
One particularly disturbing consequence of the physician fear of
termination is that physicians may be reluctant to take on severely ill or
chronically ill patients due to cost concerns.83 Similarly, the pressure to cut
costs combined with the fear of termination can also cause a physician to
place his or her self-preservation interest above the patient's best interests,
which could ultimately result in liability.84
In terms of solutions to the cost containment/liability standard conflict
within the MCO context, Katherine Record suggests aligning the incentives
of physicians with the incentives of MCOs by applying the same standard
of care to physicians and MCOs, with some limitations on the MCOs'
liability." This is essentially a proposal to have Congress remove ERISA
79. Id. at 982 (arguing that the "ERISA scheme incentivizes wronged beneficiaries to
reshape their claim into one relating to the quality of care delivered by the treating
physician... ").
80. Id. at 987.
81. Fine, supra note 5, at 659, 673 (describing how MCOs terminate providers from
their networks if they fail to comply with MCO cost containment goals).
82. Id. at 675.
83. Id. (discussing that some provider privately admit "that they are reluctant to take on
new patients who may be severely or chronically ill because of the high costs involved in
treating such patients").
84. Id. at 675-76 (discussing how threat of de-selection may cause a provider to place
his or her livelihood and the MCO's interest ahead of a patient's needs).
85. Record, supra note 2, at 994 (arguing that the foundation for needed legal reform is
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preemption from the MCO environment.
Aligning physician and MCO incentives by applying tort liability
standards to MCOs would arguably incentivize MCOs to act in a more
reasonable manner during the utilization review process. 6 Nonetheless,
Record argues that the tort liability standard, must be limited in its
application to MCOs in order to avoid over-deterrence, or MCOs will cease
to implement any cost-containment policies, including those that are
Accordingly, Record proposes the following parameters for
beneficial.
MCO liability: 1) MCO liability should not attach when coverage is clearly
excluded by the policy; 2) a MCO, in court, must be allowed to introduce,
as evidence, cost-effectiveness research to demonstrate reasonableness
under a cost-containment policy; and 3) damages must be capped. 8 In
other words, there should be similar liability-based incentives imposed on
both physicians and MCOs, but the possible scope of MCO liability should
be limited to avoid deterring the MCOs from implementing costcontainment policies that maintain quality outcomes.
Professors Agrawal and Hall posit an alternative solution to the cost
containment/liability standard conflict within the MCO context, advocating
for the imposition of liability on MCOs for the process by which they reach
their utilization review or coverage decisions. 89 Agrawal and Hall contend
that applying the existing medical liability standard of care to MCO
coverage decisions is problematic in that such a standard of care is open to
differing subjective opinions and could overly deter MCOs from legitimate
cost cutting that maintains quality.90 Instead, they argue that a processbased MCO liability standard will provide more precise predictive guidance
for MCOs as to the acceptable parameters of medical decision making, as
the MCOs would only be held liable if "they use a procedure that is not
designed to acquire and consider relevant clinical factors, or if they depart
91
materially from normal procedures without adequate justification."
A third solution to the cost containment/liability standard conflict within
to align the standard of care of practicing providers with the liability standard for providers
conducting utilization review).
86. Id. at 995-96 (arguing that holding utilization review physicians liable for breaches
of the standard of care would "incentivize the exercise of reasonable caution in denying
coverage").
87. Id. at 996.
8 8. Id.
89. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 31, at 297-98 (arguing that efforts "to improve the
process of coverage determinations [are] . . . socially constructive response[s] to tort law's
deterrence signal.").
90. Id. (arguing that application of a standard of ordinary care to MCOs would result in
"[e]xcessive second-guessing of the substance of coverage decisions [and] could over-deter
insurers' socially beneficial efforts to contain costs.").
91. Id. at 298.
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the MCO context comes from Professor Fine, who argues that the medical
profession needs to reform the standard of care to incorporate or reflect cost
containment goals.92 Fine argues that the medical profession, as opposed to
the legislature, should be responsible for creating a revised cost-conscious
standard of care because doing so recognizes that physicians have a duty to
participate in lowering high health care costs, while also respecting
physician autonomy to define the practice of medicine. 93 More specifically,
Fine urges the medical profession to incorporate cost containment
principles into clinical practice guidelines and then to incorporate those
guidelines into the standard of care.94 Fine contends that the use of such
guidelines will help minimize unnecessary care and geographic-based
treatment variations, alert physicians to the greatest cost-benefit treatment
patterns, and reduce the likelihood that a MCO will terminate a physician
for practicing high cost medicine. 95
2. Consumer-Driven Health Care Programs
Another context in which the cost containment/liability standard conflict
arises is within CDHC programs. 96 CDHC describes a system whereby
insured patients are required to pay a large part of their medical costs outof-pocket, usually through tax-sheltered "health savings accounts."
CDHC promotes cost-containment and high quality care through the idea
that if patients are given information about the costs and benefits of health
care treatment options, as well as having to shoulder more of the financial
burden of paying for their healthcare, then they will have more "skin in the
game" and greater incentive to reduce their volume of health care spending
on wasteful care or care with few benefits. 8 Although, CDHC operates
under the belief that patients will reduce spending on unnecessary care,
there is also a very real risk that patients will forgo even necessary care
92. Fine, supra note 5, at 693-94 (arguing that the best solution to the cost
containment/liability conflict policy problem is for the medical profession to "responsibly
and effectively incorporate considerations of cost into the treatment decision").
93. Id. at 695-96 (discussing the importance of allowing the medical profession to
redefine the goals of medical practice).
94. Id. at 697 (explaining how clinical practice guidelines have attracted attention as a
tool for defining the medical malpractice standard of care).
95. Id. at 700.
96. See Hall, supra note 31, at 159-161 (examining legal and regulatory issues arising
when patients are forced or choose to pay a major portion of their medical costs out of
pocket); see Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 743 (examining the effects of health care
consumerism on achieving cost constrain and quality standards).
97. Hall, supra note 31, at 160.
98. Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 747-48 (stating the principal tenet of consumerdriven health care is the idea that if patients have reliable information about the cost and
quality of care and pay more for that care out of pocket, then they "will make decisions that
drive costs down and the quality up").
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within CDHC programs because of the high costs associated with medical
care in general. 99 In other words, medical costs are expensive across the
board and there is a fear that patients will refuse non-wasteful, necessary
medical treatment simply because it is too expensive.
Focusing more on the fear of patients forgoing any and all expensive
medical care, the conflict between CDHC and malpractice liability
standards arises when a patient refuses treatment or requests suboptimal
care on the basis of cost, and then suffers an injury that would have been
avoided had the optimal, more costly care been provided.o Under such a
scenario, physicians may assert the defenses of waiver and/or assumption of
risk, but they bear the burden of litigating both defenses with the
corresponding risk that their understanding of the patient's refusal will be
second-guessed by juries.1 'o Accordingly, the medical liability standard,
which imposes a standard of care on the physician regardless of the
resources available, may result in liability against the physician, even
though the patient, on the basis of cost concerns, refused the optimal
standard of care in favor of a lesser standard of care or no care at all. 102
To harmonize the medical liability standard with the patient choice of
suboptimal care in the CDHC context, Professor Hall has argued that the
standard of care should be split into two components, one focusing on the
resources available and one focusing on the skill that must be applied to
those resources.10 3 Under this suggested liability modification, a physician
would be required to meet a set skill-focused standard of care regardless of
the patient's choice of a costly, optimal treatment or a less costly,
suboptimal treatment. 10 4 However, the standard of care applied to the
resources used in treating the patient would vary according to the level of
resources chosen by the patient.105 Hall further proposes, at least with
regard to the resources component of the proposed standard of care, that
courts recognize a defense whereby physicians can demonstrate, through
informed consent, that the patient was aware of more expensive treatment
99. See id. at 749, for an example where a physician thinks a patient might have a sprain
or torn ligament and the patient chooses to avoid getting an MRI to definitively identify a
torn ligament for repair because the MRI is too expensive.
100. Hall, supra note 31, at 175-76 (examining whether providers can be held liable for
delivering suboptimal treatment when the patient chooses to receive less expensive care or
buys more limited insurance).
101. Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 762-67 (arguing that the doctrines of waiver
and assumption of risk do not provide physicians with sufficient guidance to determine when
it is safe to provide suboptimal care).
102. Hall, supra note 31, at 175.
103. Id. at 177 (arguing for dividing the standard of care determination into a resources
component and skill component).
104. Id. at 177.
105. Id.
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alternatives, yet chose the low cost, suboptimal treatment.106
3. Pay For Performance Programs
Along with MCOs and CDHC programs, P4P programs represent
another context in which the tension between malpractice liability standards
and cost containment efforts arise. Somewhat similar to ACOs, P4P
programs tie physician reimbursement to performance, with financial
incentives offered to physicians who achieve lower costs, while maintaining
high quality. 0 7
Within P4P programs, the cost containment/liability standard conflict
arises because defensive medicine drives up health care spending in the
hope of driving down malpractice costs, while the cost cutting incentives of
the P4P program encourages less spending in an effort to control treatment
costs. 108 Physicians are pulled in diametrically opposing directions as they
simultaneously try to engage in high and low cost treatment at the same
time in an effort to reduce different sets of medical costs.
To resolve this conflict, Claire Bartholome has proposed a solution
similar to Professor Fine's proposal above, essentially incorporating the
cost-conscious P4P clinical quality guidelines into the medical liability
standard of care.' 09 Bartholome argues that such an approach will
harmonize the two because adherence to the P4P cost-conscious clinical
guidelines will reduce treatment costs, while also reducing the risk and cost
of malpractice liability."o
4. Quality Improvement Organizations
With an eye towards resolving the broader cost containment/liability
standard conflict, Professor Blumstein proposes using Quality Improvement
Organizations (QIOs) to align the standard of care with cost containment
considerations."' More specifically, Blumstein proposes using QIOs to set
106. Id. at 178-79 (arguing that recognizing assumption of risk or informed refusal of
recommended treatment as a defense along with the recommended dual standard of care
would further promote adoption of the dual standard of care).
107. Bartholome, supra note 38, at 333 (describing P4P as linking "provider
reimbursement with adherence to certain criteria aimed at reducing costs and increasing
quality").
108. Id. at 334 (describing P4P and defensive medicine as having conflicting ends, with
the former focused on reducing health care treatment costs and the latter focused on reducing
medical malpractice costs).
109. Id. at 336.
110. Id. (arguing that "the cost and quality control of P4P will provide physicians with
an incentive to adhere to responsible clinical guidelines, reducing their risk of malpractice
liability.").
111. Medical Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1048-49 (arguing that the solution for the
cost containment/liability standard tension is for Quality Improvement Organizations to set
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the standard of care ex-ante through the formulation of QIO protocols that
incorporate costs and benefits.1 12 QIOs are a federal statutory creation,
originally known as Professional Standards Review Organizations and were
created as "self-regulatory organizations of physicians .. . charged with
monitoring individual physicians' decisions affecting the use of health care
resources under federal health programs." 1 l 3 The federal statute provides
immunity to physicians who act in compliance with or in reliance on the
standards set by the QIOs.1 14
Blumstein proposes to use the QIO statute to allow QIOs to set practice
standards that incorporate quality and cost concerns.115 In doing so,
physicians following those standards would be able to avoid state
malpractice liability under the statutory-based QIO federal immunity.116
Blumstein argues that the QIO practice standards will effectively prevent
the practice of defensive medicine if they are narrowly designed as safe
harbors, such that physicians know that they will be immune from liability
if they strictly adhere to the protocols, but will conclusively be in breach of
those standards if they deviate from the protocols.1 17 To be most effective,
Blumstein contends that the protocols must target narrow, specific
circumstances, including diagnostic medicine and the use of new
technology in medicine, areas where "defensive practices are sub-optimal
and . . . quality can be maintained while reducing cost." 18
As demonstrated above, a variety of scholars have examined the cost
containment/liability standard conflict across various contexts, and they
have proposed a diverse array of possible solutions. Their analyses provide
the backdrop for predicting whether and/or how the cost
containment/liability standard conflict will operate within the ACO context
and what impact the conflict will have on the ACOs and their success or
Before conducting such an analysis of the cost
effectiveness.
containment/liability standard conflict within the ACO context, the next
section examines the structure and operation of ACOs and, more
ex-ante practice standards that incorporate cost concerns and that become the standard of
care).
112. Id. at 1048 (discussing the benefits of ex ante liability standard-setting "as a tool for
reducing uncertainty faced by medical providers).
113. Id. at 1038 (quoting Clark C. Havighurst & James F. Blumstein, Coping with
Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 6, 8
(1975)).
114. Medical Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1038.
115. Id. at 1048-49.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1048 (arguing that the controlling standards must serve as a sword and shield,
defending against liability if they are followed and establishing liability if they are
breached).
118. Id. at 1049.
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particularly, the PPACA created ACOs.
IV. ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS
A. Overview ofAccountable CareOrganizations
In 2009, MedPac issued a report to Congress calling for the creation of
ACOs as a way to control Medicare spending, while improving the quality
of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries."
In its report, MedPac's
concept of an ACO was an organization of primary care physicians,
specialists and at least one hospital that would be assigned a population of
Medicare beneficiaries and would be held jointly accountable for the quality
of care and Medicare spending costs associated with that population.120
The MedPac Report envisioned Medicare facilitating joint accountability
within the ACOs through financial bonus incentives given to ACO
providers and ACOs as a reward for lowering costs and achieving higher
quality. 12 ' ACO providers would strive to meet set quality standards while
also controlling patient volume or excessive patient use of Medicare
services. Controlling patient volume or excessive utilization would, in turn,
result in a cut in Medicare spending, thereby qualifying the ACO and its
providers for financial incentives. Broadly speaking, the MedPac ACOs
would be categorized as falling somewhere between a Medicare FFS
system and a managed care fully capitated plan system.122
In its report to Congress, MedPac examined two different types of ACO
models. The first model was a voluntary, bonus only model, in which ACO
participation would be voluntary and accountability would come in the
form of financial bonuses to ACOs for improving the quality of patient
outcomes while reducing Medicare spending. 123 The second model was a
mandatory model, in which ACO participation would be mandatory with
the same financial bonuses for good performance and penalties for poor

performance. 124

119. MedPac, supra note 10, at 39 (discussing the goals of ACO's as creating an
incentive for ACO providers to "constrain volume growth while improving the quality of
care").
120. Id
121. Id.
122. Id. at 54-55 (discussing how Medicare associated ACOs would fall somewhere on
the spectrum between Medicare FFS and Medicare Advantage).
123. Id at 40 (describing the two different proposed ACO models).
124. Id
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B. The PatientProtectionand Affordable Care Act Accountable Care
Organizations
In 2010, Congress, through the PPACA, provided for the creation of
ACOs through an incentive-based Medicare Shared Savings Program
(MSSP).125 The MSSP is to be established by January 1, 2012 and will
promote the establishment of ACOs for Medicare FFS beneficiaries.126
As with the ACOs outlined in the MedPac Report, a PPACA ACO is to
be comprised of primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals that
monitor Medicare expenditures spent on that ACO's assigned beneficiaries,
as well as the quality of care provided to those beneficiaries. 12 Also,
similar to the MedPac Report ACOs, if a PPACA ACO meets certain
quality standards and achieves certain Medicare cost savings standards, then
providers within that ACO will receive a percentage of the savings in
Medicare expenditures that the ACO achieves.128 The goal of the PPACA
ACO program "is to afford health care providers financial incentives to
promote delivery of care to Medicare patients in a coordinated manner
across a continuum of care." 29
Turning to the structural details of the PPACA ACOs, eligible ACO
entities include: group practice arrangements; practice networks;
partnerships; joint venture arrangements; or hospitals employing
physicians.13 0 The ACOs must also include the following characteristics: 1)
accountability for the quality, cost, and overall care of the Medicare
beneficiaries assigned to it; 2) a legal structure allowing for the receipt and
distribution of shared savings to participating physicians and hospitals; 3) a
sufficient number of primary care physicians to care for the number of
beneficiaries assigned to the ACO; 4) responsibility for at least 5,000
beneficiaries assigned to the ACO; 5) a "leadership and management
structure that includes clinical and administrative systems"; 6) defined
processes "to promote evidence-based medicine and patient engagement,
report on quality and cost measures, and coordinate care"; and 7) meeting
patient-centeredness criteria to be specified by HHS.' 3 ' Along with these
structural requirements, eligible ACOs must also meet certain quality
reporting requirements to be set by HHS, which will include, but are not
limited to, reporting on: "(i) clinical processes and outcomes; (ii) patient
125.

42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1) (2010).

126.

Id.

127. Id. § 1395jjj(d).
128. Id.
129. Jay L. Levine, Meeting the New Challengesfor Mergers in the Health Care Realm,
Understanding Antitrust Issues in Health Care 89, 90 (Aspatore 2010), availableat 2010 WL
3252502 (discussing antitrust implications of PPACA's ACO's).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(1) (2010).
131. Id. § 1395jjj(b)(2).
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and, where practicable, caregiver experience of care; and (iii) utilization
(such as rates of hospital admissions for ambulatory care sensitive

conditions)."l 32
On the incentive payments side of the PPACA, ACOs, physicians and
providers within an ACO are eligible for bonus payments based on savings
produced from meeting HHS designated Medicare spending benchmarks, as
well as achieving HHS designated quality standards. 3 3 ACO physicians
and providers will continue to be paid on a Medicare FFS basis for the
services that they provide, but they will also be eligible for incentive
payments if their "estimated average per capita Medicare expenditures
under the ACO for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries for parts A and B
services, adjusted for beneficiary characteristics, is at least [an HHS
an HHS designated expenditure
designated percentage below

benchmark.]"l 3 4
Focusing on the savings evaluation, HHS will evaluate savings on an
annual basis and will base the designated expenditure benchmark, which the
savings are to be measured against, on "the most recent available 3 years of
per-beneficiary expenditures for parts A and B services for Medicare feefor-service beneficiaries assigned to the ACO."'35 HHS is also required to
adjust this benchmark based on beneficiary characteristics and other
appropriate factors, and is required to update it based on "the projected
absolute amount of growth in national per capita expenditures for parts A
and B services under the original Medicare fee-for-service program, as
estimated by the Secretary." 36 The actual incentive payments to ACOs and
their members will be an HHS designated percentage of the difference
between the ACOs average per capita Medicare expenditures in a year and
the benchmark for that year.137
While Congress focused on the positive incentives for promoting quality
and cost cutting within PPACA ACOs, there was one legislative provision
regarding penalties. The PPACA includes a penalty provision that permits
HHS to impose sanctions or terminate an ACO's participation in the MSSP
if HHS determines that an ACO has taken steps to avoid providing services
to at-risk patients in order to decrease Medicare expenditures. 138

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. § 1395jjj(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(A).
Id. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B).
Id. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B)(ii).
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2010).
Id. § 1395jjj(d)(2).
Id. § 1395jjj(d)(3).
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C. Centersfor Medicare & MedicaidServices' ProposedRule
ImplementingAccountable Care Organizations
In April, 2011, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services released a
proposed rule implementing the PPACA ACOs.13 9 The proposed rule
expands on the details of the PPACA created ACOs. With an eye toward
the liability, cost cutting and quality issues raised herein, there are few
aspects of the proposed rule that require highlighting.
Generally, the proposed rule provides for ACOs to choose one of two
tracks for participation. Under the first track, for the first two years of the
ACO agreement, the ACO would share in savings, assuming it meets set
quality and cost cutting standards, but it would not be at risk for sharing in
any losses generated or spending increases.14 0 For the third year of the
ACO agreement, the ACO would be required to share responsibility for any
spending above the set spending benchmark, as well as sharing in any

savings.141
Under the second track, the ACO would share in any savings generated
and would be required to share responsibility for any losses generated
throughout all three years of the ACO agreement.14 2 Under the second
track, the ACO would be eligible for up to 60% of the savings generated
based on the ACO's quality performance, whereas ACOs under the first
track would only be eligible for up to 50% of the savings generated.143
Additionally, track two ACOs would be subject to a maximum shared loss
cap percentage of 10% of their spending benchmark which would be based
on their quality performance. 144 While ACOs, depending on the track
chosen, are entitled to up to 50% or 60% of the savings generated, CMS has
proposed to cap the amount of savings that can be paid to any one ACO at
between 7.5% and 10% of the ACO's benchmark.145
Structurally, the proposed rule provides that ACOs may be structured as
a "corporation, partnership, limited liability company, foundation or.other
entity permitted by State law." 46 Whatever form the ACO legal entity
takes, it must be capable of receiving and distributing shared savings,
repaying shared losses, establishing, reporting, and ensuring that its ACO
providers comply with the ACO program requirements and performing
47
other ACO functions identified in the PPACA.1
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

76 Fed. Reg. 19528 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
Id at 19602-03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19593.
Id. at 19621-22.
76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19616 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
Id. at 19540.
Id
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Another structural aspect to the ACOs relates to how beneficiaries will
be assigned to an ACO. The proposed rule would require each primary care
physician, who chooses to participate in an ACO, to join a single ACO,
while other provider types could be members of multiple ACOs.148 By
having each primary care physician associated with a single ACO, each
patient would be assigned to a single ACO through his or her primary care
physician. 14 9 Beneficiaries would have to be notified when they are seeking
services from an ACO provider or facility through written notifications and
signs posted in the facility, which would note the organization's status and
the implications for the beneficiary. 5 0
Operationally, the proposed rule would require that ACOs meet the
following key requirements, among others:
(1) ACO providers hold at least 75% of control of the ACO's governing

body15 1;
(2) Management of the ACO's operations by an executive, officer,
manager, or general partner, whose appointment and removal are under
control of the ACO's governing body 52;
(3) Management of the clinical aspects of the ACO by a medical director
who is a board-certified physician licensed in the state in which the ACO
operates and who is physically present in that statel53
(4) ACO providers with a sufficiently meaningful commitment to the
ACO's clinical integration program to ensure its likely success, including a
meaningful financial or human investment in the "ACO, such that the
potential loss or recoupment of the investment is likely to motivate the
participant to make the clinical integration program succeed" 54;
(5) A physician-directed quality assurance and improvement programiss
and
(6) Implementation of "evidence-based medical practice or clinical
guidelines and processes for delivering care consistent with the goals of
better care for individuals, better health for populations, and lower growth
in expenditures." 56
In addition to these operational elements, ACOs must also develop and
report to CMS certain information regarding ACO providers, including the
ACO's processes for promoting evidence-based medicine, patient
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 19563.
Id
Id. at 19567-68.
76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19541 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
Id. at 19543.
Id.
Id
Id
Id
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engagement, coordination of care and reporting on quality and cost
measures. 157
Turning to quality measures, the proposed rule proposes sixty-five
measures for use in establishing quality standards.158 These quality
measures are intended to assess five domains, including the
patient/caregiver's experience with the ACO, care coordination within the
ACO, the ACO's patient safety record, ACO efforts at promoting
preventive health, and the health of at-risk, frail, and elderly ACO
beneficiaries. 15 9 Some of the quality measures that could have a connection
to medical malpractice liability include, but are not limited to rates of
hospital readmission, medication management and reconciliation,
measurements related to health care acquired conditions, mammography
screenings, colorectal cancer screenings and monitoring related to diabetes,
60
coronary artery disease, heart failure and hypertension.1
CMS has proposed to use one of two methods to determine whether
quality standards are met by a given ACO. The first option would involve
scoring ACOs on the sixty-five quality measures to arrive at a composite
performance score, which would then be used to calculate the ACO's
This measure focuses on better
percentage of shared savings. 16 1
performance and the higher the ACO's score, the higher the ACO's
percentage of shared savings. 162 The second option uses the same
composite score methodology to determine whether an ACO meets a
minimum quality threshold. 163 If the ACO meets the threshold, then it
obtains a portion of the shared savings and if it does not meet the threshold,
then it does not receive a portion of the shared savings.164
Along with proposals related to quality standards, CMS also developed
proposals related to determining shared savings. More specifically, CMS
intends to set an expenditure benchmark projecting what an ACO's
expenditures would have been for that ACO's beneficiary population had
there been no ACO. 16 5 CMS then will compare that number to the actual
per capita Medicare spending for the ACO population. 166 Both measures
will be risk-adjusted to ensure that apparent savings in comparing the two
measures are due to the ACO's efforts and not due to treating a more
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19546-47 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
Id.at 19570.
Id.
Id.at 19571-91.
Id.at 19593.
Id.
76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19593 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
Id
Id.at 19603-04.
Id
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favorable patient mix. 6 7
While comparison of the two measures above will demonstrate the
ACO's generated savings, for each ACO, CMS will also calculate a
minimum percentage threshold of savings above an annual benchmark
amount, which each ACO must meet or exceed in order to be eligible for
any savings.168 This threshold calculation ensures that savings are due to

the ACO's cost cutting measures and not other factors.1 6 9 Notably, some
rural ACOs and those serving underserved patient populations may be
exempt from the threshold requirement or entitled to a shared savings rate
increase, if they meet certain specified characteristics.1 70
D. MedPac's Views on Accountable Care Organizations
While implementation of the ACO concept is recent and many of the
strengths and weaknesses of ACOs will become more apparent as ACOs
develop, within the context of liability standards, quality standards and cost
cutting efforts, MedPac's Report outlines some important anticipated
issues. For example, MedPac proposed that the division of ACO bonuses
among physicians and providers be in the form of a fixed percentage add-on
to their FFS payments, in order to avoid conflicts among providers over the
division of bonuses.171 Despite MedPac's suggestion, under the proposed
rule bonuses would be directly payable to the ACO entity and it would be
up to the ACO on how to distribute those bonuses to individual ACO

providers. 172
Turning to spending targets, MedPac's Report raises issues regarding
ACOs and existing regional variations in Medicare spending. In high-use,
high Medicare spending areas, the employment of ACOs could help
"reduce the regional variation in care [by providing incentives] to lower[]
the use of unnecessary services."173 Conversely, MedPac expressed
concerns that ACOs in low-use areas may have more difficulty cutting
costs and finding efficiencies than ACOs in high-use regions.174 In other
words, there will be fewer incentives for the ACO development in low-use
regions as it will be more difficult to generate cost savings, and thus more
difficult to earn savings-based bonuses. To some extent these difficulties
may be remedied by CMS' proposal to risk adjust the spending benchmark
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
over the
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1906-07.
Id at 19603-04.
76 Fed. Reg. 19528, 19603-04 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
Id at 19611-14.
MedPac, supra note 10, at 48 (discussing ways to avoid conflict among providers
division of bonuses).
76 Fed. Reg. at 19544-45.
MedPac, supra note 10, at 43.
Id. at 44.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol20/iss2/4

26

Smith: Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Physicians and the Clash of Lia

2011]

Physicians and the Clash of Liability Standards

191

and the calculation of actual beneficiary spending,17 as well as CMS'
proposal to exempt certain ACOs who serve rural or underserved areas
from the threshold savings percentage requirement and/or to provide them
with additional savings rate increases.17 6
On the spending side, MedPac expressed concern that the current
Medicare FFS system encourages physicians and providers in both high and
low-use areas to provide the maximum amount of services in order to drive
up reimbursements.177 MedPac was concerned as to whether the use of
ACO bonuses for cost cutting without corresponding overspending
penalties would sufficiently counter this strong incentive.'7 8 At the same
time, MedPac recognized that the use of bonus incentives combined with
penalties for overspending would create stronger incentives to control
volume against the lure of the Medicare FFS payment system.' 79
Even though the proposed rule allows for ACOs to choose to be bonusonly entities, ultimately, even those ACOs who choose track one will be
forced into a combined bonus and penalty ACO model.180 Accordingly, the
PPACA-created ACOs should have relatively strong incentives to control
spending volume. The only question is whether the cap on penalties allows
for penalties strong enough to overcome an individual ACO provider's
incentive to provide the maximum FFS Medicare services possible, while
also not being so strong as to deter the creation of ACOs.
Finally, MedPac raised concerns that Medicare spending in a given area
randomly varies over time and changes based on patient health.' 8 ' In other
words, not all decreases in spending are due to intentional cost cutting
measures and not all increases in spending are due to waste; some variation
is just random and natural. Accordingly, MedPac argued that the ACO
bonus structure must be set up such that ACOs are not rewarded with
shared savings for random decreases in spending, 8 2 as Medicare is not
really saving any money,' and would be giving up some of the savings

175. 76 Fed. Reg. at 1906-07.
176. Id.at 19603-04, 19611-14.
177. MedPac, supra note 10, at 43.
178. Id. (discussing the need "to counterbalance the incentives under FFS payment to
increase volume").
179. Id. at 48.
180. 76 Fed. Reg. at 19602-03.
181. MedPac, supra note 10, at 49-50, 52-53 (finding in an empirical study that random
variations in Medicare spending growth varied by five percent below or above the national
average from year to year).
182. Id.at 49, 52-53 (arguing that bonuses should reflect "actual earned changes in
performance-and not just random variation").
183. Id. at 53 (arguing that minimizing bonuses paid for random variation ensures that
Medicare saves money through ACO practices).
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that would have occurred with or without the ACOs.18 4 CMS is attacking
this issue through the use of the threshold savings percentage, but it remains
to be seen whether the size of the threshold savings percentage is large
enough to account for random and natural changes in annual spending.'
V.

ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COST
CONTAINMENT/LIABILITY STANDARD CONFLICT

The fundamental focus of this article is what impact the PPACA created
ACOs and the ACO structure itself will have on the tension that physicians
face in implementing and achieving cost cutting goals, while also meeting
the medical malpractice liability standard of care. The short answer is that
the PPACA created ACOs will probably not exacerbate the tension to the
same extent that MCOs have done, but neither will the PPACA ACOs
completely eliminate the tension either. The clearest way to examine ACOs
in terms of the cost containment/liability standard conflict is to examine
how the PPACA addresses physician liability in an ACO environment, how
the PPACA addresses ACO liability issues, and how the cost
containment/liability standard conflict will likely impact the success and
effectiveness of ACOs.
A. Accountable Care Organizationsand the ProviderLiability Standard
The PPACA fails to specifically address the malpractice liability
standard for ACO physicians and providers. 186 Nonetheless, predictions can
still be made as to how the cost containment/liability standard conflict will
operate within the ACO context based on a review of the scholarly works
above. Within those works there appears to be a consensus that physicians
will continue to face some tension in implementing cost cutting provisions
in the delivery of healthcare until the malpractice liability standard
incorporates the concepts of cost containment and efficiency.187
Unfortunately, the PPACA provision creating ACOs does not address the
intersection of cost containment concerns and malpractice liability
standards for ACO physicians and providers.188
Given the silence of the PPACA on medical liability standards for ACO
physicians and providers, it is likely that ACO physicians and providers
will continue to face the same non-cost-conscious state medical malpractice
standards of care that they face in the current practice setting. Any change
184. Id.
185. 76 Fed. Reg. at 19603-04.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2010).
187. Bartholome, supra note 38, at 336; Medical Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1048-49;
Fine, supranote 5, at 693-94; Hall, supra note 31, at 175-77; Record, supranote 2, at 984.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj.
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in the medical liability standard, within the ACO context or more generally,
will have to await the incorporation of cost concerns through further
national or state statutory revisions or the evolution of common law through
the court system. If the scholarly consensus is correct about what must
happen before physicians will fully embrace cost cutting goals, it is highly
unlikely, within the ACO context, that ACOs will fully address and resolve
the tension that physicians face in meeting both the goals of cost cutting and
the non-cost-conscious standard of care.
It may be tempting to assume that linking ACO cost cutting goals with
achieving high quality care will alleviate physician concerns that cost
cutting will subject them to possible liability. This is a false assumption for
two reasons. First, like ACOs, MCOs also claim to address the dual goals
of cutting costs and providing high quality care." 9 Nonetheless, despite the
dual aim of MCOs, physicians within the MCO context still face the cost
containment/liability standard conflict.190
The difference between the ACO and MCO context is that physicians in
the MCO context face possible termination if they do not achieve cost
cutting goals,' 91 whereas physicians and providers in the ACO context fail
to receive a bonus if they do not cut costs and achieve certain quality
standards.192 Of course, HHS may terminate the ACO's agreement if the
ACO does not meet the ACO quality standards1 93 and ACOs, including
track one ACOs, will ultimately be subject to overspending penalties.194
Still, within the ACO context, the absence of a Sword of Damocles of
termination hanging over individual ACO providers, likely alters how the
cost containment/liability standard conflict will operate within the ACO
versus MCO context.
In the MCO context, the fear of termination probably causes physicians
to strive harder to meet cost cutting goals over stringently meeting liability
standards. In contrast, within the ACO context, it seems more likely that
ACO physicians and providers will strive harder to meet liability standards
over cost cutting goals. While the threat of termination of an ACO's
agreement and the threat of overspending might strengthen the individual
provider's cost cutting incentive within the ACO, the termination and/or
penalty would occur at the ACO entity level, not at the individual provider
189. Benjamin Saunier, The Devil is in the Details: Managed Care and the Unforeseen
Costs of Utilization Review as a Cost ContainmentMechanism, 35 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 483
(2010) (noting that the HMO Act was passed to encourage the development of MCOs in
order to cut costs and achieve high quality care).
190. Fine, supra note 5, at 641-42.
191. Id. at 673.
192. § 1395jjj.
193. Id. § 1395jjj(d)(4).
194. 76 Fed. Reg. at 19602-03.
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level. Accordingly, the threat of those two negative incentives is not as
direct, immediate, and menacing as the threat to an individual provider of
MCO termination if he or she does not meet the MCO's cost cutting goals.
Simply put, individual ACO physicians and providers lose shared bonuses
or incur shared penalties if they fail to meet cost cutting goals, whereas
MCO physicians lose their livelihood.
The second reason why it is wrong to assume that linking ACO cost
cutting goals with achieving high quality care will alleviate physician
liability concerns is because quality standards set by an ACO may not
match up with the same quality standards embodied within the standard of
care. The proposed rule makes some attempt at alignment, but the effort is
not comprehensive and provides no guarantee of absolute alignment
between the two sets of quality standards.
For example, the proposed rule's measure of hospital readmissions,
medication management, health care acquired conditions, mammography
screenings, and colorectal cancer screenings 95 are measures connected to
outcomes associated with the basis for many malpractice cases, such as a
failure to screen for cancer. However, physicians following these ACO
quality standards may still be subject to liability for violating the standard
of care set by experts in a malpractice case. The standard of care, unlike the
sixty-five quality standards identified within the proposed rule, is variable,
somewhat unpredictable and only identifiable post hoc, in the course of
litigation.' 96 Accordingly, ACO physicians and providers will remain
concerned that even if they meet the ACO quality and cost-cutting
standards, they may still face liability under a different post-hoc liability
standard.
In terms of the liability standard being imposed on an ACO physician or
provider, the PPACA ACOs do nothing to ease ACO physician and
provider fears that they may be subject to state malpractice liability even if
they meet the cost cutting and quality standards of the ACO. Short of the
passage of additional statutory immunity for liability when an ACO
physician or provider meets ACO quality standards, or the incorporation of
cost concerns within the standard of care, ACO physician and provider
difficulties in meeting cost cutting goals while also avoiding liability will
not dissipate.
B. Accountable Care Organizationsand the Accountable Care
OrganizationLiability Standard
Given that the PPACA fails to address the medical liability standard of
care within the ACO setting, the only other possibility for alleviating the
195.
196.

Id. at 19571-91.
Medical Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1026-29.
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cost containment/liability standard conflict hinges on the standard
governing the ACO's own exposure to liability. By analogy to the MCO
context, if the ACO can cut costs without fear of liability for violating the
standard of care, while ACO physicians and providers must implement
those cuts and bear the burden of potential liability, then the incentives of
the two are not aligned and the physician or provider tension in meeting
both cost cutting and liability standards is exacerbated by the ACO
system. 197
As with the liability standard applied to physicians and providers, the
PPACA is mostly silent on the liability standard governing ACO's for
malpractice committed by an ACO physician or provider.198 The PPACA
does not specifically address whether ACOs may be held liable for injuries
flowing from ACO cost cutting measures, under what theory they may be
held liable, or what liability standard would apply, assuming an ACO can
be held liable for malpractice.
There are many questions that remain unanswered in terms of ACO
malpractice liability: Will ACOs maintain liability insurance? Will they
self-insure? What will be the most popular legal structure of the statutory
In other words, will most ACOs organize as
options available?
corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies or some other state
recognized legal structure?l 99 Will individual ACO physicians and
providers serve as employees, independent contractors or in some other
legal capacity? How will liability work with regard to the governing board
of ACOs? 20 0 How will liability be distributed between individual ACO
providers and the ACO entity for malpractice committed by an individual
ACO physician or provider? How will the concept of joint and several
liability function within the ACO context? These are all open questions
that will have to be answered in the future.
One certainty is that ERISA will not apply to ACOs and, therefore, will
not pose a preemption barrier to state law malpractice claims against ACOs.
ERISA only applies to employer sponsored benefit plans or plans sponsored
by an employee organization. 20 1 Unlike many MCOs, ACOs are neither of
these types of plans, but rather are legal structures, recognized under
applicable state law, through which a group of physicians and providers
provide care and treatment to a designated group of Medicare
- - 202
beneficiaries.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Record, supra note 2, at 957-58, 964-65.
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj.
76 Fed. Reg. at 19540.
Id. at 19541.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A); 76 Fed. Reg. at 19540.
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Without ERISA preemption, courts will likely extend malpractice
liability in some form to ACOs for the decisions that they make, especially
if courts follow a similar course to the managed care liability case law. A
similar course would seem likely, given the similarities between the
intended impact of MCO and ACO decision making on physician decision
making and the quality of patient care.
MCOs impact the quality of patient treatment by conducting utilization
203
review of physician treatment decisions, approving or denying coverage,
and terminating or penalizing physicians who fail to control costs by failing
to provide treatment in accord with utilization review decisions.20 4
Similarly, under the PPACA, ACOs will set quality and cost containment
standards and then incentivize ACO physicians and providers for meeting
those standards through the provision of bonuses and/or imposition of
overspending penalties.205 Under both scenarios, the entity, be it an ACO or
MCO, attempts to impose or strongly encourage certain standards of
practice and/or treatment decisions that are driven by quality and cost,
though some may argue that the MCOs standards are driven more by cost
than quality. 206
In light of the similarities in how MCOs have impacted and how ACOs
will impact the way that physicians practice medicine and the quality of
patient care, Agrawal and Hall's summary of MCO malpractice liability
case law is helpful in predicting how medical liability standards may apply
to ACOs.207 First, if courts view the ACOs as providing direct care to
Medicare beneficiaries, analogous to hospitals, then the courts may apply a
direct corporate negligence theory to ACOs, imposing upon them a duty to
"select and retain competent caregivers, to oversee the care they provide,
and to establish and adhere to policies to ensure quality care." 208 Within the
MCO context, courts extended this concept of direct corporate negligence
even where the MCO did not employ the physician, but rather arranged "for
the provision of services by contracting with independent caregivers and
institutions."209 Courts expanded the theory of direct liability beyond the
employment relationship because of the central role that MCOs played in
the delivery of health care services. 210

203. Record, supra note 2, at 960.
204. Fine, supra note 5, at 641-42.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(B); 76 Fed. Reg. at 19602-03.
206. Record, supra note 2, at 961-62 (noting that MCO utilization review may be, but is
not necessarily antithetical to promoting quality care).
207. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 31, at 241-45 (summarizing and analyzing court
treatment of MCOs for state law claims of direct corporate and vicarious liability).
208. Id. at 241.

209.

Id.

210.

Id. at 242 (discussing how courts hinged MCO liability on their "'central role in the
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The legal reasoning for imposing direct liability on MCOs applies
equally to PPACA ACOs. Like MCOs, each PPACA ACO will also select
which physicians and providers will be a member of that ACO, as well as
oversee the care that is provided, including the quality of that care through
the setting of quality and cost standards and incentivizing individual ACO
providers to meet those standards.211 Given the direct impact on ACO
beneficiaries of the ACO's setting of cost and quality standards and the
strong influence that the availability of ACO bonuses and penalties will
likely have on individual ACO providers, it seems likely that courts will
find that ACOs play a central role in providing quality healthcare to ACO
beneficiaries. Furthermore, it seems likely that courts will find this ACO
role to be so central to the healthcare received by ACO beneficiaries that
courts will impose direct liability on ACOs, even if individual ACO
providers are not employees of the ACO.
The second theory of liability that courts might apply to ACOs is the
theory of vicarious liability. Within the MCO context, courts extended
vicarious liability to MCOs to hold them liable for the negligence of their
independent contractor physicians.2 12 The courts imposed vicarious liability
on MCOs using the doctrine of "apparent or ostensible agency to find an
agency relationship between a managed care organization and an
independent physician."2 13 Generally, but with some variation, apparent
agency requires a plaintiff to establish that the MCO or ACO "held itself
out as a provider of health care, and that [the plaintiff] relied upon that
conduct, looking to the managed care organization rather than to the
individual physician to obtain health care services."2 14
Given that the proposed rule requires ACOs to post signs in their
facilities and provide written notification to beneficiaries that a particular
provider is an ACO provider,215 the doctrine of apparent agency should
apply within the ACO context. It is difficult to understand how an ACO
could mount a defense to an apparent agency claim, where the use of such
written notification and signage plainly communicates to a beneficiary that
they are receiving care from an ACO. Through the signage and notification
requirements, the proposed rule essentially requires ACOs to hold
themselves out as health care providers.
That said, in the ACO context, the reliance element of an apparent
total health care' of enrollees").
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(b), (b)(2)(E)-(G), (b)(3)(C) (2010).
212. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 31, at 243 (discussing how courts applied vicarious
liability to MCOs for network provider negligence as an analogy to imposing vicarious
liability on hospitals for the negligence of independent medical staff physicians).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 76 Fed. Reg. at 19567-68.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2011

33

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 20 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 4

198

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 20

agency claim might be difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on, depending on the
factual circumstances. Unlike MCOs, "ACOs cannot require Medicare
beneficiaries to only use certain providers. Rather, ACOs must obtain
savings through efficiency and recommendations to their patients."2 16
Accordingly, an ACO may argue more strongly that the plaintiff, in seeking
care from the individual ACO provider, was really looking toward that
individual ACO provider and not the ACO for the provision of care, since
ACO patients can choose to see any primary care provider or specialist that
they want.217 By contrast, many MCOs require their patients to see certain
MCO selected providers, thereby creating a much strong reliance argument
for a MCO plaintiff.218 Therefore, MCO plaintiffs, overall, have a stronger
apparent agency argument when suing a MCO for a MCO provider's
malpractice contrasted with an ACO plaintiff suing an ACO for an
individual ACO provider's malpractice.
Even if ACOs are able to avoid vicarious liability through apparent
agency principles, courts may still use an implied authority theory to hold
them vicariously liable for independent contractor physicians and providers,
219
In the past, courts have held
as they have done in the MCO context.
MCOs vicariously liable under "the doctrine of respondeatsuperior for the
medical malpractice of an independent physician if the managed care
organization had implied authority to exercise sufficient control over the
physician to negate an independent contractor status." 22 0 Whether such a
theory would apply to ACOs depends on what the courts determine to be
sufficient control. There can be no doubt, however, that the setting of
quality and cost cutting standards with bonus and penalty-based incentives
imposes some level of control from the ACO onto the individual ACO
physician or provider. Accordingly, the implied authority theory of
vicarious liability is a doctrine that may apply to ACOs for the negligence
of individual ACO physicians or providers, at least where the ACO uses
independent contractor physicians and providers.
The important point to draw from the above discussion is that without
ERISA preemption, it is possible, if not likely, that courts will impose some
form of liability on ACOs for the negligence of ACO physicians and
providers. To that extent, both the ACO physician/provider and the ACO

216. Solomon et al., Future Models, 33-OCT L.A. Law. 34, 35 (2010).
217. 76 Fed. Reg. at 19562.
218. Joshua Tenzer, Reaching the Final Frontiers in Medicaid Managed Care, 62
N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 329, 367 (2006) (arguing that the general population has
restricted health care choices because MCOs restrict patient provider choice).
219. See Agrawal & Hall, supra note 31, at 244 (discussing state law expansions of the
common law bases for holding MCOs liable for the negligence of independent providers
with whom they contract).
220. Id
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have somewhat aligned incentives. Both face liability if the ACO imposes
cost cutting that goes too far and impedes the ability of the ACO physician
or provider to deliver treatment in a manner that meets the non-costconscious standard of care.221 Certainly, the threat of liability against the
ACO somewhat eases the cost containment/liability standard conflict faced
by ACO physicians and providers, so that, unlike MCO physicians, they do
not feel stuck in the middle between non-cost-conscious liability standards
and cost cutting pressures being imposed by an entity that is practically
immune from liability. 22 2 Still, the extent to which ACO physician and
provider liability-based incentives and ACO liability-based incentives will
be aligned remains an open question until courts determine how they will
allocate joint liability between ACOs and ACO physicians and providers.22 3
C. The Interference of the Cost Containment/LiabilityStandardConflict
with the Goals ofAccountable Care Organizations
Along with examining the impact of ACOs on the cost
containment/liability standard conflict, it is important to consider what
impact that tension will have on the ACOs functionality and their goals of
cutting costs and achieving high quality care. There are two likely impacts,
one on the physician or provider side and one on the entity side. Both
impacts are troubling.
On the physician or provider side, the MedPac Report noted that within
the ACO framework there exists a "tragedy of the commons" problem in
that the individual physician or provider's incentive to choose a costly,
revenue producing surgical procedure tends to override the ACO-group
incentive to choose a less costly, lower revenue producing procedure.224
Under the FFS system, the revenue from the more expensive procedure
inures solely to the benefit of the individual physician choosing that
procedure.225 It is reduced only by that physician's share of the savings that
would have been realized in a bonus had he or she chosen the less
expensive procedure.22 6 The individual incentive to increase revenue
outweighs any incentive to save costs for the benefit of the group, so that
221. See Record, supra note 2, at 988-90 (arguing that imposing liability on MCOs "for
negligent coverage determinations incentivizes reasonable care in making these
determinations and would help reduce tension between the physicians providing care and the
insurers challenging their treatment decisions.").
222. See Fine, supra note 5, at 642.
223. Record, supra note 2, at 998 (discussing that courts have not addressed the issue of
allocating liability between physicians and insurers in the MCO context).
224. MedPac, supra note 10, at 51 (providing a practical example of the "tragedy of the
commons" problem examining the impact of an interventional cardiologist's decision to treat
angina through use of a stent versus treating it medically).
225. Id.
226. Id.
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there is a small financial incentive to reduce costs through individual
actions. 227
This "tragedy of the commons" problem is likely to be exacerbated by
the existence of the cost containment/liability standard conflict. As
discussed earlier, the threat of a malpractice liability standard that does not
account for costs along with an ethical directive to provide all beneficial
care regardless of cost 2 28 encourages physicians to engage in costly
defensive medicine. 2 29 Defensive medicine together with the "tragedy of
the commons" problem and the FFS system will likely push ACO
physicians and providers even further towards providing more expensive
care instead of meeting the cost cutting and quality standards of the ACO.
ACO physicians and providers may make an individual judgment that the
risk of liability combined with the individual financial value of providing a
more expensive treatment or test outweighs any shared savings or bonuses
that that individual physician or provider would realize from adopting a less
expensive treatment or test.
Given the "tragedy of the commons" problem, MedPac contended that
"the [ACO] financial incentives would have to change joint practice-level
decisions to be effective."230
MedPac identified those decisions as
including "care protocols, equipment purchases, recruitment strategies, and
incentive structures offered to physicians (e.g., do not tie physician income
to increased revenue generation)." 2 3 1 To eliminate the overriding individual
financial incentives, MedPac argued that ACOs would need to structure
themselves such that individuals "give up some autonomy and make
clinical practice and technology acquisition decisions jointly."23 2 However,
in making this suggestion MedPac does not appear to have considered the
problem of defensive medicine and the non-cost-conscious liability
standard of care, or how those two factors interact with the "tragedy of the
commons" problem. Those two factors will likely make the "tragedy of the
commons" problem worse, as there should be great concern that the group
bonus incentives may not be strong enough to overcome the trifecta of
defensive medicine, FFS payment individual incentives and the "tragedy of
the commons" problem.
Turning to the impact of the cost containment/liability standard conflict
227. See id. at 50 (contending that "individual [ACO] physicians have very little direct
financial incentives to restrain volume because they would receive 100 percent of the
revenue from increases in their patients' volume butonly [a small share] of the ACO bonus
from restraints in their patients' volume").
228. Fine, supra note 5, at 651, 663.
229. Hall & Schneider, supra note 11, at 748.
230. MedPac, supra note 10, at 52.
231. Id.
232. Id
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on the entity side of the equation, there should also be concern about
whether the conflict will undermine the ability of the ACO to be effective
or to achieve its goals as an entity. If ACOs can be held liable for physician
or provider negligence and/or the impacts of the ACO's cost cutting
measures, then there should be concern as to whether imposing on ACOs a
liability standard that does not consider costs will chill or overly deter ACO
cost cutting. In other words, the specter of ACO liability may be so strong
as to completely undermine the entire ACO concept and deter even
beneficial cost cutting that does not impact care within the standard of care,
i.e. cost cutting of wasteful care.
Looking at concerns raised in the debate over whether or not MCOs
should be subject to malpractice liability, it is possible, within the ACO
context, that the specter of tort liability could chill cost cutting innovations
or could lead ACOs to abandon cost-control entirely and cease to exist.233
Even worse, given that ERISA preemption is likely lifted in the ACO
context, ACOs might also collapse under the weight of increasing numbers
of massive punitive tort awards.234 Though the imposition of liability
would encourage higher-quality care with regard to ACO services, it would
also likely increase the cost of care.235
The threat of overspending penaltieS236 at the ACO entity level should
provide somewhat of a counterbalance to the incentive to provide as much
care as possible in order to avoid liability costs. However, the optimal level
of counterbalancing will not occur unless the overspending penalties are
large enough to deter overspending on care and the bonuses are large
enough to offset any increased liability costs flowing from cost cutting
measures. Otherwise, the ACOs face a zero sum game. Even worse, if
injured ACO patients are allowed to sue the ACO governing board, who set
the ACO cost cutting and quality standards, the fear of liability may impede
the ability of ACOs to form and even get off of the ground.237 At this point
in time, whether or not PPACA and the ACO proposed rule have struck the
appropriate balance on the bonus and penalty side of ACOs is an open
question, to which the answer will only be apparent once ACOs begin to
operate.
The concerns raised in this section are about a balancing game. Liability
imposed on either ACOs or their physicians and providers is valuable
233. Agrawal & Hall, supra note 31, at 262.
234. Id. at 271.
235. Fine,supra note 5, at 692-93 (discussing the costs and benefits of imposing liability
on MCOs).
236. 76 Fed. Reg. at 19602-03.
237. Medical Malpractice,supra note 9, at 1045 (expressing concern that QIO cost and
quality standard setting would be impeded by placing those responsible for setting the
standards at risk for liability).
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insofar as that liability standard does not interfere with cutting wasteful care
and discourages cutting costs that result in providing care below the
standard of care. However, if the liability standards are overly aggressive
and the fear of liability at either the physician and provider level or the
ACO entity level outweighs the savings reaped from beneficial cost cutting
or ACO penalties for overspending, then liability will undermine ACOs,
their purposes, and discourage them from forming or functioning as they
should. Policymakers and courts should take care to ensure the proper
balance between setting liability standards that properly discourage poor
quality care and encouraging cost cutting incentives that properly cut
wasteful care.
VI.

CONCLUSION

An ever repeating chain reaction exists within the health care system.
Health care spending continuously spirals upwards and insurers and
innovative health care delivery programs react by imposing cost cutting
measures on physicians. The problem is that the liability standards faced by
physicians do not react to increased health care spending in the same way
that insurers and health care delivery programs react. Accordingly, the
physicians face the cost cutting measures, while also facing a lagging noncost-conscious medical liability standard.
This tension that physicians face is not new. What is new is how this
tension will operate within the new PPACA ACOs. In some ways, within
the ACO context, the tension will merely be a reiteration of a similar
tension that already exists within the MCO environment. In other ways it
will be different. The non-cost-conscious liability standard will be the same
within the ACO environment as it has been within the MCO environment.
In creating ACOs, the PPACA does nothing to alter the medical liability
standard of care. To that extent, ACO physicians and providers' lack of
enthusiasm for embracing the cost cutting goals of ACOs will probably be
similar to their lack of enthusiasm for embracing the cost cutting goals of
MCOs.
The major distinction between the cost containment/liability standard
conflict within the ACO context versus the MCO context is that the former
entities face a much higher likelihood of shouldering liability for cost
cutting decisions that negatively impact physician or provider treatment of
ACO patients, while ERISA often provides a federal preemption barrier for
MCOs. As a result, ACOs should be much less likely than MCOs to
encourage unrestrained cost cutting on physicians and providers. The threat
of liability to the ACO entity should work to align the ACO entity's
incentive to avoid liability with similar risk avoidance incentives that will
exist for the ACO physicians and providers.
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Despite the likely close alignment of an ACO's liability-based incentives
with similar incentives for ACO physicians and providers, there should be
substantial concern as to whether the threat of liability for both ACO
physicians and providers and ACOs as entities will undermine efforts to
achieve cost cutting associated with wasteful, non-beneficial treatment and
diagnostic testing. Courts and policymakers should be concerned that the
threat and cost of liability may overwhelm the bonus and penalty-based
incentives, which encourage ACOs and their physicians and providers to
cut costs while achieving quality standards. Accordingly, as ACOs develop
and move forward, Congress, HHS, and the judicial system should be
cognizant of the possibility that the positive goals of ACOs may be
undermined by the existing medical malpractice system and should
carefully balance the goal of cost cutting with the imposition of malpractice
liability on both ACOs and ACO physicians and providers.
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